"Police need immense support from intelligence services"
Dr Hasan Abbas is a Research Fellow at Belfer Center's International Security Program at Harvard University and a former Police official who served in the administrations of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto (1995-1996) and President Pervez Musharraf (1999-2000). He is also the author of 'Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army and America's War on Terror' and 'Sovereignty Belongs to Allah: Constitutionalism and Human Rights in the Islamic States'. His latest work is a research paper on Police reforms in Pakistan.

Training conditions
How well trained and equipped are the police to be able to counter the increasing threat of terrorism and insurgency? That's a million-dollar question
By Waqar Gillani
The police, a cadre entrusted to maintain law and order and investigate crime, are today easy targets of terrorist attacks -- all for want of proper training. But, now, perhaps, things will change, as the police are beginning to garner some attention of the relevant authorities.

Unstable constables
The plight of low-ranking policemen
By Ali Sultan
Police constables are full of contradictions. When they are not taking bribes from motorcyclists, raiding someone's house or trying to look tough in the hot sun, they are usually shy, and once the reserve is broken, easy to talk to.
It is late afternoon. Mehboob Amjad, 30, is sitting on a bench in Mozang and enjoying what seems to be the last morsels of a hearty meal which consists of naan and pakoras.

Varied motives
The militants are better trained than the police…
By Aoun Sahi
Experts believe the militants are not only better trained as compared to the police, their motivation level is also high. "They have been fighting the war in the name of religion while the police officials are fighting because they get salaries," says Rahimullah Yousafzai, senior journalist and Resident Editor, The News Peshawar.

The attacks on Sri Lankan cricket team followed by an attack on the Manawan Training Institute some time ago were an eye-opener if indeed we needed one. Both incidents exposed the extreme vulnerability as well as the inability of the police to cope with terrorist attacks that have already struck and are not threats anymore.

Ever since the country came under the grip of suicide bombings followed by near insurgencies more than two years ago, the police being symbols of state and power, along with the armed forces, have been on the receiving end. They have been hit in the federal capital, in Lahore and in parts of NWFP, even though the operations against the insurgents were being carried out by the military.

The new thought emerging from within the US, which has been most generous in giving aid to Pakistan's military in the context of its war on terror but without yielding great results, is that the police need to be better-equipped -- and not just because they are vulnerable. They need to be trained and made effective as a better counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency force.

By way of an example, a recent report published by Institute for Social Policy and Understanding quotes that in the year 2007, the US allocated $731 million to help the country's military and only $4.9 million for the police. It is this report and many more such initiatives that have now compelled the US to allocate $100 million to the country's police every year.

This Special Report tries to highlight the existing limitations faced by the police in infrastructure, training and intelligence gathering etc. The consensus being that terrorism is an internal threat which only the police is capable of handling; instead of fighting a war that has been imposed on them, the police can pre-empt many of the terrorist activities with better resources and intelligence.

Understandably, this line of thinking will be problematic in areas of Balochistan and FATA where paramilitary agencies have been maintaining law and order all these 60 years following the British colonial model.

That perhaps was how the problem began. The tribal areas were not treated as part of the country and were led to exist as no-man's land. This is how the terrorists gained roots in these areas, a spread of which we now witness so helplessly.

We have also tried to examine and compare the training of a policeman and a jihadi to highlight the difference in the level of commitment and to gauge the strength of the enemy.

Senior and concerned policemen see the recent attempt of preparing the police as a counter-terrorism force as a temporary phase. They believe that ensuring security for all is their ultimate target. Majority of them hark back to the Police Order 2002 and its implementation as the solution towards this final goal.

Constable Muhammad Khalid, standing in the harsh summer sun on a roadside post in Kundal, Mianwali district, seems least interested in fighting the terrorists who, only two months ago, destroyed the newly-built post some 100 metres away.

"See, we've only a few automatic guns and one light machine gun with a few hundred rounds only, and we are supposed to fight the Taliban that are armed to the teeth with hand grenades, suicides jackets and rocket-propelled guns. Isn't it ridiculous?" he asks, bitterly.

Khalid says he has not fired a single round -- officially -- for the past five years or so. Due to a lack of resources the department is unable to hold even the annual firing practice for most of them. Mercifully, he does have a bullet-proof jacket which he sports when an officer is visiting the post. He doesn't have any ballistic proof helmet.

The living conditions in such isolated check posts for policemen who are supposed to check the influx of Taliban from NWFP into Punjab are simply funny. Available to the 20-odd policemen, there is only one room that can barely accommodate 10 charpoys. Consequently, "we have to take turns to sleep", which means half of us will be on duty for 24 hours.

"There is no wash room or kitchen in the premises," he reveals. "Can you believe the post is without electricity either? We make do with a torch or the flashlight in our mobile phones or, at best, candles -- in order to check the people in the dark."

As there is no hedge or shade available, on a hot summer day, Khalid and his colleagues have to occasionally rest under the trees that, again, are a good few metres away from the check post.

Akbar Nasir Khan, Superintendent Police (SP), in charge of police in Mianwali district, tells TNS that nine policemen have been killed and three police check posts targeted by terrorists in the last three months. "It is one of the most important and sensitive districts of Punjab as it borders with the four districts of NWFP, including Dera Ismail Khan. There are six entry points from NWFP to Mianwali where we have police posts. The working conditions at these check posts are not good. The policemen are exposed to all kinds of threats and the terrorists can target them from a safe distance as there is not even a single custom-made check post. They have to stand in the open to check vehicles."

Akbar Khan admits that many of the police constables are not prepared to meet the challenges of the new situation, "The present political leadership and the police management are very serious about fighting the menace but what's more important right now is to prepare the lower staff for the 'war' against terrorism for which they require human as well as financial resources."

According to him, at least 2,369 policemen are required to properly manage the law and order situation in the district and to ensure that the entry points from NWFP are properly policed. "Till two months ago, Mianwali had only 1,200 policemen but the number has now raised to 1,800 including one hundred each of Elite Force and Rangers. But I need 500 more policemen to run the affairs smoothly in the district.

"We plan to establish five new check posts along the NWFP border to bar the inflow of terrorists. Presently, I have only two heavy machine guns and one armoured vehicle in the district which is out of order. The policemen deployed on six sensitive posts have night vision devices but they do not have CCTVs or sniff dogs."

Over the past two years or so, Pakistan's police force has suddenly been pushed into the frontline of the US-led war on terrorism, as the hunt for terrorists and militants shifts from a military war along the Afghanistan border to a police operation inside the country. The poorly-trained and ill-equipped police force of Pakistan is not able to tackle the new situation.

In the first place, the police is not trained or equipped to be more than an anti-riots force. Secondly, they do not have the logistics or the infrastructure to fight the war.

"The situation is tricky. The police are absolutely clueless about the new scenario. Terrorists, considering police as a symbol of the state, are targeting them like anything.

"In 2005, there were 113 attacks on police in different parts of the country in which nine policemen had been killed, but the number of attacks soared to 1,820 in 2008. The death toll (of policemen) alone was 575."

Akbar Khan says "certain quarters" never let police become a real force. "It (the police) has always been used for the political motives of the rulers and portrayed as a very demoralised and corrupt force.

"The resource allocation to police is also ridiculous. The military gets about 20 percent of the federal budget, but the police receives only one percent (of the budget). Most of the US aid to Pakistan also goes to the military and not the police. In 2007, the US gave 862 million dollars and in 2008 it gave 731 million dollars for military spending. Again, in 2008, the US gave only 4.9 million dollars for law enforcement and the judicial system.

"We've already seen how even the military that has heavy machine guns, tanks, helicopters and missiles, has not been able to successfully fight the menace. Police is being pushed to fight this war when more than 70 percent of policemen don't even have automatic guns."

The entire country has some 3,75,000 policemen to meet the needs of almost 160 million people, which means the ratio is one policeman to 430 people.

The police are technically weak as well; it does not have the capability to trace phone calls. Hence, "it has to rely on the security agencies. The radio system of police is so old that anyone with a good scanner can hear our official conversations."

Jawad Ahmed Dogar, Assistant Inspector General (AIG), Logistics, Punjab Police, tells TNS that the Punjab police has 1/10th of the resources it requires to perform its routine operational job -- that of maintaining law and order in the province.

"Only 20 percent of the Punjab police has the automatic guns. Normally, only 20 rounds are given to a policeman with the gun when he assumes a special duty. Funds for purchasing ammunitions are so limited that for many years we could not hold the firing practice for our constabulary."

Jawad says, in the current fiscal year, Punjab police has not been allocated a single penny other than the routine funds. "Police needs a lot of equipment such as helicopters, sniper rifles, light machine guns, video surveillance system and latest wireless sets to discharge its normal duties. Every police station should have at least one armoured vehicle, but in Punjab, we have less than 50, some of which are very old."

The building department of Lahore police recently compiled a report about the physical conditions of the city/district's 77 police stations. According to the report, 30 police stations in Lahore are housed in rented buildings while the buildings of 15 police stations have been declared dangerous. Those stations that have been declared fit do not have basic facilities like proper toilets, lock-ups, stores for arms and ammunition, barracks for constabulary, and waiting rooms for visitors.

According to a Lahore-based police official, "Nine of the police stations have been issued notices by the building department to evacuate the premises as the structure of these buildings could collapse any time."

The situation in NWFP where the police has literally been fighting the war against the cold-blooded terrorists is no better. Sajid Ali Khan AIG Logistics, NWFP police, tells TNS that the police are faced with a lot of problems. "We do not have sufficient funds to equip over 50,000 policemen of the NWFP police on modern lines. We lack the very basic equipment such as bullet-proof jackets and ballistic proof helmets. We have only around 7,000 bullet-proof jackets while 3,500 helmets.

"The NWFP police has only 20 armoured personnel carriers, five of which are 40-year-old Soviet models. They break down so often that we have to send a mechanic along with the police party using these vehicles."

The official further says the police do not have sufficient number of wireless sets and video surveillance equipment, "We have only a few sniffer dogs to check truckloads of explosives. We have no helicopters and no aerial mobility. In transport we have half of peacetime requirements."

A project coordination unit has been formed recently in NWFP under which Rs 4.5 billion will be spent in the next three years to repair and build police lines, police stations and check posts in the province and also to buy modern equipment for the force.

Police in Pakistan does not lack resources on the operational front only. "Leave alone the modern 'kits' or mobile forensic labs required to properly collect evidences and preserve the crime scene, most police stations in the country don't even have cameras to photograph the crime scene or the criminals," says another high-ranking police official, on condition of anonymity.

"We have only five forensic labs in Pakistan at present while we need at least 50 modern forensic labs with DNA-testing facility to ensure speedy and up-to-the-mark investigation."

He adds that the police do not have the automated system meant to check fingerprints. "The police don't even have the facility to preserve the body parts of suspected suicide bombers, collected from the crime scene."

The News on Sunday: In the war on terror, whose role is more important -- military's or police's?

Afzal Ali Shigri: There are two kinds of terrorism: individual acts, such as suicide bombing, target killing; and then you have a large number of people banding together and starting an insurgency. When the insurgency grows, it gets out of control and the army has to be involved. The police are neither sufficiently trained nor are they capable enough to deal with it. Though, once the insurgency has been taken control of, the police will be able to help maintain the position.

Combating terrorism is a long-term affair. It's not just about prevention. It's about investigation of cases and then following them up. It's a very long-drawn-out process, for which I think the police are better suited. Worldwide also, this kind of terrorism is dealt with by police organisations.

TNS: In the past one year or so, it appears the police are the prime target of suicide bombers/terrorists. Comment.

AAS: It's very simple. Anybody who wants to take on the state will try to hit the symbol of the state and the symbol of authority; in this case, the police force. When the army gets involved, it is targeted. It's not a new phenomenon nor should it surprise anybody. All over the world, the law enforcing agencies are targeted so that their morale is affected and they become ineffective.

TNS: Do you think the police are sufficiently equipped to fight the war on terror? What is the state of resources and infrastructure, and the state of preparedness?

AAS: Well, the police have had issues such as their salary, provision of equipment and accommodation. Besides, there should be a programme for rehabilitation of the families of policemen who are hit or killed.

Similarly, the place where you are working and the place where you live should be secure.

Unfortunately, all these things have not happened yet. For decades the police have been neglected. Seldom an effort is made, money comes in, but it is usually considered to be an expenditure which is not really needed. They don't have sufficient numbers nor equipment and infrastructure, a proper place where they can live, work and train themselves. It's very tragic.

TNS: Does it mean the police are being thrown in to fight a losing battle?

AAS: The attitude of the authorities is such that once the police are provided with vehicles that are for all times in the future. Come off it, these vehicles have a life and they should be replaced after a certain time.

Similarly, weapons should be upgraded and replaced. It's very unfortunate that everybody who has ruled this country has only neglected these issues.

The best example is Islamabad Police. Here, the Inspector General of Police has been given office space in an abandoned building which is not safe. The SSP and other officials have also been accommodated in a market which is fully exposed. Interestingly, the sessions court and DC's office are also housed in the market. This shows how much importance you give to law enforcement and delivery of justice. The result is for all to see. If you come to Islamabad you'll see beautiful buildings of National Arts Council as well as different departments of Agriculture Ministry. You have a grand secretariat. But the people who are to protect the masses, who are to maintain order, have no proper place to sit and work.

TNS: The police are also assigned political duties? Isn't it at the cost of their actual function which is to provide security to masses?

AAS: See, the political or VIP duties are part of the police's duties. The police have to take them up. But, they should be given latest resources for that.

TNS: Was the situation any better during your tenure as I G Police?

AAS: I retired in 2003. Pervez Musharraf was the president at the time. Police Reforms were introduced in his tenure. I told him that Reforms were important but resources should also be facilitated. It was decided at the federal level that a package of Rs 2 billion will be provided to the police department every year. Provinces where there is a need for transport or equipment were to be given uniform equipment, and so on. The very next year, the amount was reduced to Rs 1 billion.

So, I'd say, there is a lack of commitment on the part of the higher authorities towards investing in Police. The result is their (the police's) poor performance.

When I was I G Police, we got Rs 2 billion. This was in 1993. So we started construction of a building and bought a lot of equipment. The sad fact is that more than a decade later, the building is still under construction.

It is needed that a reserve police should be raised under Inspector General Police in every province. The interior minister promised it would be done in the provinces, but nothing has come out of it so far.

We can't waste time. There is a great urgency. The need of the hour is that everybody -- across all political divide -- should get together and say that there has to be an investment in police so that they can take on terrorism and also be more helpful to the military.

TNS: Do you think there is a lack of commitment on the part of the police as well? Do you think pay raise would alter mindsets?

AAS: The Police Order 2002 was drafted to address such issues. But no one implemented the Order. In 2004, even before it could be implemented, the Order was changed, drastically.

See, we are talking about a malady which is very deep-rooted and complex. To remedy it, you require a professional police force.

I'd also suggest that the police are given operational autonomy and that there is no political interference in their work. Also, their accountability should be made ruthless. In the present circumstances, if the police officials have influential political figures for mentors, you can't touch them.

TNS: Police's one grouse is that courts often acquit terrorists. Is it because of some inadequacy in law or some flaw in police investigation itself?

AAS: The quality of investigation ought to be very competent, and similarly the prosecution has to be very good.

The disease is basically widespread and complicated. The need of the day is that all things are addressed at one time, and a beginning is made here and now.

Dr Hasan Abbas is a Research Fellow at Belfer Center's International Security Program at Harvard University and a former Police official who served in the administrations of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto (1995-1996) and President Pervez Musharraf (1999-2000). He is also the author of 'Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army and America's War on Terror' and 'Sovereignty Belongs to Allah: Constitutionalism and Human Rights in the Islamic States'. His latest work is a research paper on Police reforms in Pakistan.

The News on Sunday: What prompted the compiling of the report on the police, in the first place?

Hasan Abbas: I was motivated to compile a report on the subject for two primary reasons: a)In my assessment, there was no report available on the topic that covered the issues relevant today (i.e. counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency angles and the importance of police; b)being a Pakistani former police officer I have a passion for the subject and I am proud of the days when I wore that uniform and served my homeland in a humble way; and c)I was distressed to see that there was no public discourse in Pakistan or in the policy circles of the United States about this critical issue -- especially in the light of the rising insecurity in Pakistan which is impacting the life of every citizen. I thought I must start 'lobbying' for the cause on my own even if no one else is interested initially -- because without major financial investment, Pakistan police cannot be reformed.

TNS: What were your main findings?

HA: The most important conclusion I reached was, 'a stitch in time saves nine' -- meaning an effective law enforcement action, as permitted by the law of the land, is a much better option than waging a war later on. For instance, I was able to access many files and records of the Lal Masjid (known as the Red Mosque globally) cases, from 2004-05 period, and after many interviews also in Islamabad (June 2008) I realised that the whole crisis could have been resolved well in time if the Islamabad Police had been permitted to pursue the cases through a due process of law. My study of other international cases also teaches me that well-trained, motivated and well-paid police are an utmost necessity to successfully fight terrorism and insurgency.

TNS: Why this sudden realisation in the US that police need reforms and training to counter terrorism?

HA: There was actually not much realisation about this till recently and even now it is low on the priority list (as far as I know). The emphasis is rather on training counter-insurgency tools to Pakistan army and Frontier Corps -- which is also important but cannot be a substitute for police reforms. Only a handful of organisations and individuals started writing on this. For instance, reports from International Crisis Group (July 2008) and Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (2008) are good. Many retired police officers in Pakistan are also writing on the subject and, in this age of internet, the message is spread globally. Many serving police officers are also committed and inspired to change the direction of police and there is no dearth of competent and dedicated officers, quite contrary to the general perception. Tariq Khosa, Tariq Pervez, Sarmad Saeed, Pervez Rathore, Zulfikar Hameed and Fasihuddin are some of the finest officers working for a real change in this direction. An excellent organisation by a police officer in Peshawar is one such example (see: http://www.pakistansocietyofcriminology.com). I am sure there are many more.

Secondly, there is also a realisation in the US that the use of force alone creates attendant problems and armies cannot resolve everything.

TNS: What are the salient features of the expected US funding in terms of the police structure, training pattern and conditionalities?

HA: I think at the moment there is interest in the US and the European Union to focus on the NWFP police (for equipment, higher salaries and relevant training). But ultimately (and hopefully) there will be focus on better training for police throughout the country and the government of Pakistan will be encouraged to implement the 2002 Reforms in letter and spirit (minus the 2004 amendments in the Police Act of 2002). I seriously doubt if there will be any conditions attached to such support in this sphere.

TNS: Why do you think police are an important tool to counter insurgency and fight terrorism as compared to the military?

HA: Army's primary job is to defend the borders and not to fight crime inside the country. I believe terrorism and even insurgency is a law enforcement issue in essence. Yes, army is supposed to come to rescue law enforcement agencies when called upon under serious situations, but they are not the first line of defence in state's internal law and order issues. More importantly, army is trained to 'shoot to kill' -- whereas effective counter terrorism and counter insurgency requires sophisticated responses -- and use of force is but one component of such strategies. However, police certainly need immense support from country's intelligence services -- both ISI and IB -- and should also revamp and re-organise the various police departments related to intelligence gathering.

In this context, I must add that in Swat-like situations, army has to clean the area first and then the police can go in and hold the area so that civil institutions can start functioning again and people get a feeling of security. Only a professional police force can do that. But tragically, Pakistan has never invested in such a police force. It would have helped Pakistan more than long-range missiles, submarines and fighter aircrafts.

TNS: How can the police be effective in Pakistan's North Western Frontier, Balochistan and FATA, considering it's the paramilitary agency that has traditionally maintained law and order in most parts of these areas?

HA: In NWFP, police are the main crime-fighting and law-enforcing force. But it is true indeed that in parts of Balochistan and FATA, paramilitary forces (especially the Frontier Constabulary) is the primary agency tasked to maintain law and order, besides civilian levies, etc. This is a legacy from the British colonial times. They needed paramilitary outfits and Pakistan should have adopted a different approach from 1947 onwards. Even now it is not too late -- and my recommendation is that the FC should be converted into a police force for FATA in a gradual manner. Rather than army officers, police officers in a step-by-step fashion should be given commanding positions in the FC. Once the draconian Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) is completely discarded, it will be easy to make this conversion. Rule of law is a recipe for all the major ills Pakistan is afflicted with today.

TNS: Considering the existing infrastructure, how long will the police take before they are fully equipped/trained to meet the requirements?

HA: I think if funds are made available today and common sense is used while devising a reform strategy, it won't take them more than 3 to 5 years to transform. These things take time because we are also looking for changing the 'thana culture' and making police force an efficient and accountable force. There is a tendency in Pakistan to overemphasise the 'elite force' phenomenon which, in my assessment, is not the answer because reform of mainstream police is the real issue. Better counter terrorism capacity is only one of the intended goals whereas provision of security to everyone irrespective of one's status and influence is the larger objective. Militancy, terrorist tactics and violent methods succeed where lawlessness prevails and thrives.

TNS: How can intelligence-led policing be made effective in Pakistan?

HA: It will take Pakistan a while before forensic capacity and technological tools are more accessible. So in the meantime, better intelligence can fill in the gap, especially in the counter terrorism arena. For this to happen, police will need help from IB, ISI and the MI, etc.

The police, a cadre entrusted to maintain law and order and investigate crime, are today easy targets of terrorist attacks -- all for want of proper training. But, now, perhaps, things will change, as the police are beginning to garner some attention of the relevant authorities.

History

Before Partition, there was only one police training centre in Phillaur in the united India. The lower ranks such as constables were trained how to handle a gun and tackle the law and order situation. After Partition, the training of assistant superintendents of police was conducted at the Police College, Sardah, an institution established in 1913 near Chittagong, East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). The lower ranks were trained at the local level. After 1971, makeshift arrangements were made and training of officers was conducted at the Civil Services Academy, Lahore, and Police Training College, Sihala (Punjab). Fifteen year ago, there was a police training school in every division. Later, these were closed due to lack of resources and capacity of trainers.

Pakistan adopted the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) introduced by the British. Till 2002, Pakistan police followed the Police Rules 1934 for training purposes. However, between 1997 and 2002 a new training policy was devised.

Current status

In 1978, the National Police Academy (NPA) was established in Islamabad. In 1989, the government understood the need for a proper academy for the police and ordered the planning and construction of the NPA. It took 10 years for the Academy to become functional.

There's another training school for recruits in Islamabad. A lower-rank training is imparted at the provincial level.

In Punjab, apart from the famous Police Training College, Sihala, Rawalpindi, there are five training schools for the police. In Sindh, there are only three to four schools -- with lesser facilities, a senior police officer who has served in all provinces, tells TNS, requesting anonymity.

"The situation in NWFP and Balochistan is pathetic." In NWFP, the major police training school is in Hangu, whereas Balochistan also has a training school. That's why, usually, police batches of different ranks from other provinces (except Sindh), including Azad Jammu and Kashmir, are trained in Punjab from time to time. Punjab also has a special cadre of Elite Police Training School in Lahore.

No counter terrorism module

Generally, the courses that Pakistani police are offered range from the level of the constable to that of the deputy superintendent police (DSP). The subjects taught are police management, police proficiency, physical and weapon training; laws, human rights, investigation training, attitude change and computer training for lower class (constables and head constables), intermediate class (ASIs), upper class (SIs, Inspectors), advance courses and examination for promotion. Islamayat as a subject is taught at these schools as well -- but not terrorism.

Besides, there is emphasis on physical fitness, weapon training, use of cover and gun firing.

Elite force

For the first time in Pakistan, in the 1990s, Elite Force was constituted in Punjab to tackle such issues. Recruits were given army commando training as well. Presently, Sindh is following the Punjab model.

The sanctioned strength of Elite Force is 7,000 but currently 1,000 seats are lying vacant.

The Elite Force commandos are selected from within the police. The Force is given 250 rounds of fire for practice of each weapon as compared to the police's ordinary training where only 40 rounds are given in a nine-month course and, sometimes, even less than 40 because of budgetary constraints. They get a much better diet and enjoy a better environment during training.

Learning with time

"We lack the capacity to train police," says a senior officer of Punjab police, talking to TNS. "But now we have to learn to counter terrorism."

He says in the previous regime (2002-07), the police started recruiting in large numbers. "Since there was no vacancy for training in schools they were sent to the districts that were without any schools. "As a result, the training standard declined.

"It was only after the attacks on Mianwali check post that a small course of training for machine gun was introduced for the police guarding the post," the officer says.

Another senior officer of the police says that tackling insurgency and terrorism is difficult. "It's impossible to train the entire police force. Like Elite Force, we can have a select, well-equipped training force to ensure efficiency."

According to him, the present state of training is sufficient for the police but not for fighting terrorism.

Mubasharullah, principal of Police Training School in Lahore says, "We should focus on army-style courses and refresher courses, use latest weapons, improve weapon training tactics, enhance intelligence network like telephone recording and tracing."

The future

"We are expanding the training centre in Sihala and existing schools," says Fayyaz Mir, Additional Inspector General (AIG), Punjab Police (Training).

"There is a need for incentives, budget, and political commitment.

"Elite Force is being increased to 10,000, while a well-equipped rapid response force is also being set up in Punjab to tackle these incidents."

Police constables are full of contradictions. When they are not taking bribes from motorcyclists, raiding someone's house or trying to look tough in the hot sun, they are usually shy, and once the reserve is broken, easy to talk to.

It is late afternoon. Mehboob Amjad, 30, is sitting on a bench in Mozang and enjoying what seems to be the last morsels of a hearty meal which consists of naan and pakoras.

"What do you think the government should do to improve the performance of the police against terrorism?" I ask.

Mehboob Khan who is the middle of drinking a cold glass of water finishes it and says: "We are not given any training for fighting terrorists. The current mode of training is just enough to save our own skins. Our training modules usually finish in 15 to 20 days. The government should introduce army commando-style modules and I guarantee that the whole police force can be trained in a year."

Musa Khan, who looks 18 but is actually 21, is smiling. He is standing behind two road blocks and a large iron-gate, behind which lies the district police lines. "What we need are decent working hours. We stand here, on duty, for eight hours everyday. At some places, constables are on duty literally for 24 hours! We should be given six hours a day and then rotated."

When asked about protection, Musa says the constables -- especially those on check posts and gates -- are severely under-equipped. "We should be given helmets and body jackets that the Elite police forces use."

Because it is night time, Shahid Ali, who is checking suspicious motorcyclists, is a little jumpy. Forty, fat and wearing kohl in his eyes, Shahid is disgruntled. "People loathe us, our superiors use us like servants and the terrorists don't even leave us when one of us dies.

"The government has promised to increase our pays, but no one has been given an increment. I do this job just because I have to fend for my family."

Khalid Chaudhry, 28, is standing at a paan shop and smoking. "We are only going to win this war if we are fully facilitated. We need faster cars, we need better guns and ammunition."

When asked how they deal with the stress and morale issues in dealing with terrorism, he says: "There is no issue of low morale. Whoever joins the police force knows what they are getting into. We are paid to do this job. Goli tu pehle bhi chalti thi. Ab buss goli chalaney wala badl gaya hai!"

Experts believe the militants are not only better trained as compared to the police, their motivation level is also high. "They have been fighting the war in the name of religion while the police officials are fighting because they get salaries," says Rahimullah Yousafzai, senior journalist and Resident Editor, The News Peshawar.

"Their trainers, fighting the war for the past 30 years, have developed some indigenous techniques to train these people."

Police officials admit in private that on a motivation level, their force is far behind terrorists. "In NWFP, so far, more than 500 policemen (mostly in Swat) have quit jobs because they are afraid of being killed by Taliban. Their fears are not baseless, as last year alone more than 125 policemen were killed in NWFP in different terrorist attacks," says a high police official of NWFP.

According to him, due to continuous exposure to life threatening situations day by day, majority of policemen in his province are depressed and demoralised "because they were never trained to fight the war and there is no refresher training course available to them."

A recent study done by the Pakistan Society of Criminology, in the wake of the recent scenario, shows that 80 percent of policemen in NWFP scored high on Burn-out scale. Fifty-five percent (55%) scored high on Stress scale. Most of them also reported signs of depression and insomnia during interview which was also confirmed by their official records of frequent leave applications. "These symptoms, if they continue without intervention, may lead to severe depression and even suicidal behaviour."

The situation is no different in other parts of the country; after the Manawan Training School two months ago, many constables under training refused to rejoin the training. It took more than two weeks for the school administration to convince them to rejoin.

Major (retd) Mubasharullah, SSP training, Lahore, told TNS that the tenure of training of police constables had been reduced from nine months to six months due to lack of resources. "The major thrust of training is maintaining law and order. There are no refresher courses available to policemen. If a constable fails to get promotion during his 35 or 40 years long service, he will never get training other than the one he gets on his joining." According to him, a constable only fires 65 rounds on different semi-automatic and automatic guns during six month course of training.

On the other hand, an ex-jihadi told TNS that during training they can fire hundreds of round. "The day started at dawn with Fajar prayer followed by readings from Quran. We always were asked to recite the verses related to jihad and then start the physical training. I was also given training in usage of pistols, rifles, grenades and rocket-launchers."

During training different Mullahs used to visit us. "They used to tell us that the real destination of a Muslim is heaven where he will live forever with the pure and beautiful companions, houris and will also get sacred wine and different kinds of fruits, honey, and we will have our horses to ride on."

On the final days we were asked to dip our hands and face in buckets full of animal blood just to make us strong. "We were trained to a level that a single person was able to handle four people at once and it was inculcated in our mind that our opponents could not kill us unless Allah so desired so we should not have fear of death. And even if a jihadi dies fighting, he will go to heaven, we were told."