Almost a week after what many have called an extremely anti-climactic end to the Long March, debate continues to rage about its significance. Accusations and counter-accusations are being thrown around by the leadership of the legal fraternity, political parties and ordinary citizens alike. All sorts of conspiracy theories are doing the rounds on TV and the print press in which major protagonists, such as Aitzaz Ahsan and Nawaz Sharif, are the target of ruthless criticism.

However, the controversy over the decision to end the Long March early should not detract from the fact that Rawalpindi and Islamabad have never before been witness to a political gathering of such magnitude. The huge crowds that greeted lawyers and political activists in the procession through Rawalpindi -- home to the army -- and their responsiveness to the damning slogans that were raised against the military establishment were a testament to the depth of feeling that pervades society about the existing system of government.

It is unlikely that so many people will come out onto the streets again in the near future to send a message to the men in khaki and those political forces that are not yet willing to break with the status quo that things must change. Perhaps this is why many young lawyers, students and political activists were terribly disappointed at the manner in which the whole event concluded, in that the sheer number of people out on the streets deserved a more emphatic ending.

But in truth such emotions are a reflection of political naivete. The fact of the matter is that just the sheer fact of people wanting change does not mean that change will happen. The lawyers have played a massive role in reintroducing a popular demand for change, but they themselves cannot be expected -- and neither is there consensus within the legal fraternity on what change should take place besides the quite broad demand for an independent judiciary -- to be the vanguard of change in the way that an explicitly political organisation can be.

Amongst the existing political forces, a clear line has been drawn between those who are stakeholders in the existing dispensation and those who are not; or, in other words, between those who contested elections and those that boycotted them. This difference was underlined very obviously in the debate that followed the ending of the Long March: it was the APDM parties that are outside the parliament that were in favour of a more confrontational posture whereas even the PML-N adopted a slightly more circumspect position.

It is therefore worth considering each side's stance and whether any one side is more committed to change than the other (because all rhetorically claim that they are -- this extends to the PPP as well). For all of its fire, the APDM has demonstrated very little mettle over the past many months. In its conference immediately after the Long March, there was a whole lot of bark but not very much bite. In other words, while the PPP and the 'moderate' segment of the lawyers' leadership were heavily criticised, the APDM did little more than 'threaten' civil disobedience at some time in the (distant) future.

In any case, what kind of change is the APDM committed to? Its most notable component is the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), which has always been the right hand of the establishment and is at best committed to an extremely retrogressive notion of change. Its politics have always been in direct opposition to many of the other component parties of the alliance, and particularly the ethno-nationalists who demand a complete reconfiguration of the state. In the final analysis, the APDM seems to be a conglomeration of forces with very little stake in the post-February 18 political order. Its dominant component, the JI, has a track record of destabilising democratic experiments with the connivance of its establishment patron.

On the other side of the fence are the PML-N and the PPP, both of which have clearly expressed a commitment to sustaining the post- February 18 political order. Some have argued that the PML-N might be interested in winding up the present setup, so as to take advantage of its surge in popularity in Punjab and the PPP's attendant loss of popularity after the general elections. However, Nawaz Sharif's speech at the end of the Long March flew in the face of this point of view.

It is not surprising that both parties are keen to stay in power. They need power to be able to dole out patronage to party workers and ordinary voters alike, thereby giving their creaking party organisations some respite after nine years of dictatorship. However, given the dramatic shift in the public discourse in recent times, they must balance the imperatives of power politics with the popular demand for change. The PML-N is better placed to negotiate this rather difficult task, but both parties will struggle to maintain their public image given the multiple crises to which the Pakistani state is subject.

In short, all of the political forces in Pakistan currently talking about change -- and here the MQM's and PML-Q's of the world are deliberately excluded, because they do not even claim to be committed to challenging the establishment -- are either unable and/or unwilling to actually effect it. This does not mean, as some were suggesting at the end of the Long March, that the fledgling parliament should be targeted, because it is ultimately the parliament that represents the people's will. And in the absence of alternative political forces willing to construct an entirely new political order, attacking the parliament serves little purpose than to reinforce the dominance of the military establishment.

However, at the same time, those of us who want change in this country are not satisfied with the political forces that currently do represent us in the parliament. Given that the people voted these forces into power, we have to accept the mandate that they enjoy. But if we genuinely believe that the people voted for the PPP and the PML-N only because they represented the opposition to military rule rather than a bonafide political alternative, then it is our job to create this alternative so that if and when another Long March happens, there is a political force that is able to propagate change of the kind that we want.

As suggested earlier, the Long March proved once and for all that people want change, and that there is a healthy constituency of political activists, professionals and students that can act as the motor for a politics of change. Rather than express frustration and anger at others for not propagating change, it is now high time for those who want change to come together and build a new politics. It will take time and there will no doubt be resistance on the part of existing political forces, let alone the establishment. But is there any other choice?

Everybody has heard of Donald 'Weapons of Mass Destruction' Rumsfeld, the acerbic-tongued former US Secretary of Defence who was amongst the principal architects of the Iraq war and a leading member of the Bush administration's neo-conservative cabal.

But Rumsfeld is a man of many parts. Not only did he guide the invasion and occupation of Iraq by US forces (who have killed hundreds of thousands of innocent Iraqi civilians in the process), he has been a pilot in the US military, a congressman, a White House chief of staff in the Ford administration and later Secretary of Defence in the same administration, an ambassador, a businessman and a civil servant.

He was the youngest ever Secretary of Defence when President Gerald Ford appointed him to that job in 1975, and the oldest ever person to hold that job when incoming President George W Bush brought him back from the world of business in January 2001 and asked him to head the Pentagon. But few people know that he is also a poet -- well, a poet of sorts at any rate.

Until the build-up to the Iraq war, Rumsfeld's poetry had found only a small and skeptical audience: the Pentagon press corps. Every day, at his Pentagon briefings, Rumsfeld regaled reporters with his impromptu riffs, sarcastic flourishes and witticisms. Few of them seemed to appreciate it, however. This could either be because they had no poetry in their souls or because they simply had no idea that what Rumsfeld was actually doing in his briefings, in effect, was spouting verse.

Rumsfeld's poetry was nothing if not paradoxical. As one critic noted, "it used playful language to address the most sombre subjects: war, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, mortality."

Back in the mid-1950s, American poet Donald Hall wrote: "Each moment is political, and we / Are clothed in nothing but mortality." Such formulations, however, were not Rumsfeld's forte. His verse was more about indirection and evasion. He never faced his subject head on but wove away, letting inversions and repetitions confuse and beguile his audience. In the words of one commentator, "his work, with its dedication to the fractured rhythms of the plainspoken vernacular, was reminiscent of the poetry of William Carlos Williams."

Williams (1883-1963) was born in Rutherford, New Jersey, and educated in Europe and at the University of Pennsylvania, where he qualified as a doctor of medicine. After further study in New York and Leipzig, he practiced as a pediatrician in Rutherford and also pursued a career as an author. At university he had met Ezra Pound and Hilda Doolittle ("H.D."), and his first volume of Poems, published privately in 1909, placed him in the Imagist school, although he was later to move away from this approach. His poetry was popular, since it was simple and direct in style.

Rumsfeld's verse is in the same colloquial vein. The poems that follow are the exact words of the Secretary of Defence, as taken from the official transcripts on the US Defence Department website:

The Unknown

As we know,

There are known knowns.

There are things we know we know.

We also know

There are known unknowns.

That is to say

We know there are some things

We do not know.

But there are also unknown unknowns,

The ones we don't know

We don't know.

-- Feb 12, 2002, Department of Defence news briefing.

Glass Box

You know, it's the old glass box at

the --

At the gas station,

Where you're using the little things

Trying to pick up the prize.

And you can't find it.

And it's all these arms are going down in there,

And so you keep dropping it

And picking it up again and moving it,

But --

Some of you are probably too young to remember

Those --

Those glass boxes,

But --

But they used to have them

At all the gas stations

When I was a kid.

-- Dec 6, 2001, Department of Defence news briefing.

A confession

Once in a while,

I'm standing here, doing something.

And I think,

"What in the world am I doing here?"

It's a big surprise.

-- May 16, 2001 interview with the New York Times.

Happenings

You're going to be told lots of things.

You get told things every day that don't happen.

It doesn't seem to bother people, they don't --

It's printed in the press.

The world thinks all these things happened.

They never happened.

Everyone's so eager to get the story

Before in fact the story's there

That the world is constantly being fed

Things that haven't happened.

All I can tell you is,

It hasn't happened.

It's going to happen.

-- Feb 28, 2003, Department of Defence briefing.

So, now you know that whatever hasn't happened is going to happen -- unless, of course, it's already happened. This is another way of saying that while Donald Rumsfeld may be the 'Bomber of Baghdad', he's no Wilfred Owen -- the outstanding poet of World War I who was killed in action in France in November 1918, a week before the Armistice.

Owen, who was born in Shropshire, England, joined the British army in 1915. In 1918 he was awarded the Military Cross for exceptional bravery in the field. His poetry did not appear in book form until after his death. Poems was published in 1920 and a definitive volume, The Collected Poems of Wilfred Owen, did not come out until 1963.

Owen said his poems were about "war and the pity of war". The poetry, he said, "was in the pity." Rumsfeld, on the other hand, would probably say his poetry was "in the WMD" -- now known as 'weapons of mass disappearance'.

Dr Jaspal Singh, vice-chancellor of the Punjabi University, Patiala, was born in a refugee camp in the Indian state of Himachal Pradesh in 1952. His family originally belonged to Muzaffarabad, Azad Jammu and Kashmir, and his forefathers were agriculturists. He did his master's in Political Science from Aligarh Muslim University; and his PhD on Sikh scriptures and historical heritage from University of Punjab, Chandigarh.

After completing his post-graduation in 1975, Dr Jaspal Singh joined Khalsa College, Delhi, as a lecturer of Political Science. He remained with the college for 24 years, till 1999, before joining University of Delhi. When Inder Kumar Gujaral became the prime minister of India, he appointed him as India's ambassador to Mozambique, where he served for three years.

After completing his diplomatic stint, Dr Jaspal Singh returned to India and re-joined the University of Delhi. He was working as principal of Guru Gobind Singh College of Commerce in New Delhi when he got the offer to become vice-chancellor of the Punjabi University, Patiala. He also remained general secretary of the Delhi Sikh Gurudwara Management Committee and is a member of the Political Affairs Committee of the Shiromani Akali Dal (Badal). The News on Sunday interviewed him recently in Patiala on the sidelines of the Punjabi Conference. Excerpts follow:

The News on Sunday: What was your reaction when you were chosen to represent your country as an ambassador? How did you find the shift from teaching to diplomacy?

Jaspal Singh: When Inder Kumar Gujaral became the prime minister of India, he asked me to undertake a diplomatic assignment. It came as a surprise to me and I told him that I may not be a suitable person for a diplomatic job. We have been very close since the 1980, so I think Gujaral Sahib thought that I would make a successful diplomat. Finally, on his insistence, I accepted the offer to become India's ambassador to Mozambique. Gujaral Sahib assured me that I would be able to do justice with a diplomatic assignment.

TNS: What do you think in retrospect?

JS: I think that I did justice with the responsibility that was entrusted to me by Gujaral Sahib, who himself is a seasoned diplomat and a selfless politician.

TNS: You mentioned in your address during the Punjabi Conference that when you were India's ambassador to Mozambique many Pakistanis also approached you for help. Would you like to tell us more about this?

JS: When you are in a country that is far away from the subcontinent, normally the differences between the people of India and Pakistan are resolved and they become close to each other. As Pakistan does not have an embassy in Mozambique, the people of the country used to come to me for all sorts of help. They felt that since there was no Pakistani embassy in the country, they should approach the Indian Embassy for help. Moreover, the Pakistani and Indian families in Mozambique have a close relationship -- in many cases, the husband is from Pakistan and the wife from India, or vice-versa.

TNS: What did you do after returning to India?

JS: After returning to India, I rejoined University of Delhi. Later, I became the principal of Guru Gobind Singh College of Commerce in New Delhi, which is rated among the best Indian institutions for the study of commerce, economics and information technology. I served as head of the institution for seven years.

TNS: When were you appointed as the vice-chancellor of the Punjabi University?

JS: I was appointed as the vice-chancellor of the Punjabi University in December 2007. If I remember correctly, I joined on December 11.

TNS: What is the procedure for the selection of a vice-chancellor In India?

JS: The vice-chancellor is appointed by the chancellor (governor of the state) on the recommendation of the government. So, in effect, this responsibility was given to me by the Government of Punjab.

TNS: Would you like to tell us about the Punjabi University?

JS: Patiala's Punjabi University is only the second university in the world that has been named after a language -- the first being the Hebrew University in Israel. Established on April 30, 1962, the Punjabi University is one of the premier institutions of higher education in north India. Initially the university's mandate was to develop and promote the language, literature and culture of the Punjabi people; however, it has evolved as a multi-faceted, multi-faculty educational institution with 55 teaching and research departments. It offers degrees in disciplines as diverse as Fine Arts, Biotechnology, Forensic sciences and Space Physics. The university offers excellent facilities to both students and researchers. It has a modern, well-planned campus, situated on the Patiala-Chandigarh road at a short distance from the main city. Sprawling across 316 acres, the campus is away from the din and noise of the city markets and roads. The university has recently launched world's first Punjabi search engine (Punjabi Khoj) along with its website in Punjabi.

TNS: How has been your experience as vice-chancellor of the Punjabi University?

JS: My experience has been very, very positive and encouraging. I am sincerely committed to the university and am trying my best to promote its image.

TNS: How did the idea to organise the Punjabi Conference come to your mind?

JS: One of the main objectives of the university is to promote Punjabi language and culture. We have Punjabi Department, Punjabi Language Department, Punjabi Development Department, as well as departments related to other activities for the development of Punjabi. We also have a publication bureau that brings out books mostly in Punjabi, but also in other languages. In short, we are doing a lot for the promotion of Punjabi language and culture. In line with this vision, we decided to organise a conference to discuss the situation of the Punjabi language and culture in other Indian states. Initially we planned to invite people only from the neighbouring states of Haryana, Rajasthan, Arunachal Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh and Delhi, but later decided to extend the conference's invitation to all states of India. The basic idea was to invite people from all over the country and provide them with an opportunity to visit only the second university in the world that has been named after a language. The response was very positive and delegates from all states of India participated in the conference.

TNS: Would you like to tell us something about the India-Pakistan Punjabi Conference that preceded this event?

JS: The India-Pakistan Punjabi Conference was a roaring success and people from both sides of the border attended it. It was great to have Punjabis from Pakistan here in Patiala. We exchanged views on various issues and the bond that existed already has been strengthened with the conference.

TNS: What is the medium of instruction at the Punjabi University?

JS: Basically there are three mediums of instructions: English, Punjabi and Hindi.

TNS: How many students are currently enrolled in the university?

JS: The Punjabi University is one of the biggest universities in India. It has 55 departments and 140 colleges are affiliated with it. We have about 3,100 employees and the total number of students currently enrolled is almost 10, 000.

TNS: Would you like to tell us about the Punjabi University's Interfaith Department?

JS: The university has Guru Gobind Singh Department of Religious Studies, which has sub-departments of Sikhism, Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, Buddhism, Jainism, Zoroastrianism, etc. So, all religions are taught in one department. In a way, it is a centre of inter-faith understanding. It is a centre of understanding each other's religion. It is a unique kind of department. I don't know if any other university in the world has this kind of department. The university's publication bureau has also brought out some very good books on different religions.

TNS: Can anybody learn any religion?

JS: Yes. There is no restriction that only a Sikh student can study Sikh religion. The admission is open to all and the students are free to study any religion.

TNS: How about having students from Pakistan?

JS: I think that there is no harm in this. In fact, this was also discussed in the India-Pakistan Punjabi Conference.

TNS: The future of the Punjabi language and culture was a major concern of most delegates who attended the conference. Would you like to comment on this?

JS: I think there were apprehensions among the delegates regarding the future of the Punjabi language and culture. Some people say after 50-100 years Punjabi language will not be in the same state as it is now. That was the apprehension expressed by most delegates, but I don't believe in that. I have full faith in the Punjabi community living in India, Pakistan and in other parts of the world. I have full faith that they will realise the importance of their mother tongue.

(Email: zaman.mzkhan@gmail.com)

As a statement of the fiscal policy, the annual national budget seeks to attain certain macro-economic objectives, such as growth, employment, price stability and correcting fiscal and external account imbalances. At times, these objectives may come into conflict with each other, forcing the policy-makers to effect a trade-off. For instance, while maintaining the growth momentum may necessitate increase in public expenditure, growing fiscal deficit may call for greater prudence in government spending. Fiscal policy objectives and the capacity to achieve them are conditioned by the state of the economy. Therefore, soundness of budgetary measures depends on how correctly they respond to the state of the economy. The same may be applied to the budget for the fiscal 2008-09 (FY09).

We begin by looking at the state of the economy as depicted in The Economic Survey of Pakistan for the outgoing fiscal (FY08), ending June 30. Most of the economic indicators show downward or negative trend. Gross domestic product (GDP) growth has decelerated to 5.8 percent from 6.8 percent in the previous year, mainly due to lackluster performance of the commodity-producing sectors -- agriculture and manufacturing. Agriculture has grown by 1.5 percent and manufacturing by 5.4 percent. The investment-GDP ratio fell to 21.6 percent from 23 percent, while savings-GDP ratio dropped to 13.9 percent from 18 percent. The fiscal deficit (Rs683 billion) has reached 6.5 percent of GDP, while current account deficit ($11.6 billion) has widened to 6.8 percent of GDP.

Inflation as measured by consumer price index (CPI) is at 10.3 percent, including 15 percent food inflation that mainly affects the lower-income groups. The foregoing is a rather dismal picture of the economy facing increasing fiscal and current account deficits and inflationary pressures, and falling savings and investment levels -- largely a gift of the inflationary growth policies of the outgoing government. The task before the new government, therefore, was to arrest these negative trends. Let's see whether the budget FY09 has succeeded in this!

The targets set in the budget FY09 indicate that the government prefers growth with stability to growth for the sake of growth. GDP growth target has been set at 5.8 percent, well below FY08's budgetary target of 7.2 percent. The fiscal deficit will be contained at 4.7 percent of GDP, while current account deficit will be reduced to 6 percent of GDP. Inflation will be contained at 12 percent. However, the question remains whether these targets are attainable. The three instruments available to the government to achieve its fiscal policy targets are the power to spend (public expenditure), levy taxes (public revenue) and borrow (public borrowing). Let's see how these instruments will be used in the next fiscal!

The total public expenditure in FY09 is estimated at Rs2.01 trillion, 7.48 percent higher than FY08's estimates of Rs1.87 trillion and 10.44 percent less than the revised target of Rs2.22 trillion. The total revenue target is estimated at Rs1.25 trillion, 26 percent higher than FY08's revised target of Rs990 billion. In addition, net capital receipts have been targeted at Rs221 billion, compared with FY08's Rs59 billion. Thus, while the total estimated expenditure for FY09 is Rs210 billion less than the revised estimates of FY08, the revenue target is Rs250 billion higher than the same. It has been targeted that the fiscal deficit will be reduced to Rs582 billion ñ 4.7 percent of GDP -- in FY09 from Rs683 billion in this fiscal (by 17.35 percent). This sounds good, but only on paper. Every year, actual expenditure exceeds the estimated expenditure without a corresponding increase in the revenue, thus adding to the fiscal deficit. In short, if the government meets its revenue target and does not overstep expenditure estimates, it will be a big achievement.

To contain public expenditure, the government has taken the difficult decision of reducing subsidies on fuel and electricity. In FY08, the government provided subsidies worth Rs407.48 billion, including subsidy of Rs175 billion on petroleum products after an unprecedented hike in international oil prices. As upward pressure on oil prices continues, the government has decided to pass the burden to the consumers gradually and reduced oil subsidy for FY09 to Rs140 billion. In all, subsidies have been reduced to Rs295.20 billion in FY09 from Rs407.48 billion in FY08 (by 38 percent).

While the cut in subsidies will help reduce fiscal deficit, it will add to inflationary pressures. This will affect both consumers and businesses and may also impede other objectives of the government, such as reducing current account deficit, increasing economic productivity and raising the level of savings. Economic productivity will go down as resources will be diverted to speculative or non-productive activities, such as investment in the real estate sector. Surge in prices of inputs will push up the cost of production and, thus, drive up the final price of exportable goods making them less competitive in the international market. Savings will be discouraged partly due to reduction in real incomes, the single most important factor behind savings, and partly due to increased consumer spending in anticipation that prices will go up further. Finally, increased inflation will have an enormous social cost, because it will hit hardest the salaried class and the poorer sections of society.

With a view to increasing public revenue, the budget FY09 proposes to levy additional taxes to the tune of Rs77 billion. Of these, Rs48 billion will be collected through indirect taxes, while the remaining through income tax, which is a direct tax. The proposed indirect taxes include Rs41 billion general sales tax (GST) and excise duty, and Rs7 billion customs duty or import tariffs. Indirect taxes raise the final price of the product, because the burden (though not entirely) is conveniently shifted to the consumer. The government argues that the increase in GST will not be inflationary, as increased price will force people to cut down on consumption. Such an argument, however, is only partly valid.

Fall in consumption in the wake of a price increase depends on the elasticity of demand. If the demand is elastic (responsive to price change), higher price will reduce consumption; however, in case of inelastic demand, price hike has only a marginal effect on consumption. Since essential goods have inelastic demand, increase in GST will increase their prices without reducing consumption and will, thus, be inflationary. Hence, one may argue that if the purpose was to increase revenue without raising inflation, additional GST should have been imposed only on luxury items, whose demand is elastic. However, the problem is that in the face of an elastic demand, increase in prices may reduce -- rather than increase -- revenue, because people will consume less.

When an economy is facing strong inflationary pressures, additional taxes should preferably be in the form of direct taxes, such as capital gains tax that the government had planned to levy before the announcement of the budget FY09; rather than indirect taxes that tend to be inflationary. Already, direct tax-GDP ratio, according to The Economic Survey, is only 4 percent. However, significant widening of the direct tax net requires political will, which the government probably could not muster.

In FY08, Rs550 billion of the total fiscal deficit of Rs683 billion have been financed through bank borrowings, especially from the State Bank of Pakistan. Financing from the central bank, which takes the form of printing money, is the most convenient but also the most inflationary source of financing. Alive to this, the government has decided to borrow mainly from the market to meet the fiscal deficit. Accordingly, the budget FY09 envisages receipts of Rs31 billion through the issuance of a global bond, Rs50 billion through issuance of Pakistan Investment Bonds and Rs 20 billion through sale of prize bonds. To make the National Savings Scheme more attractive for the people, the interest rates have been increased by two percent. Only time will tell how effective these planned borrowings from the market were. However, the idea in itself is sound.

Now we come to the current account deficit, which is mainly due to trade deficit of $17 billion in the first 10 months of FY08 and is projected to reach $20 billion (12 percent of GDP) for the whole year. Trade deficit can be reduced either by increasing exports or cutting imports. In the short run, fiscal policy can help promote exports, mainly by reducing input cost. This can be done in several ways, such as providing subsidies to the export sector, reducing import tariffs on raw materials and components (intermediate goods), and reducing inflation. But for a country already facing huge fiscal deficit, provision of subsidies to the export sector is a big ask. This leaves us with the reduction of import duties on intermediate goods, which has been announced in the budget FY09 on a number of tariff lines.

Regarding cut in imports, the only way the budget can do this is to increase customs duties. Taking advantage of the flexibility available due to a big gap between Pakistan's bound and applied tariffs, the government has increased customs duty on some 300 items, most of which are electronic appliances. Being luxury goods, the demand for these items is elastic; thus increased prices are likely to reduce their demand. In conclusion, while the budgetary targets embody a correct response to the state of the economy, the measures announced to achieve them are not likely to be effective. The budget also shows that the government's foremost concern is to significantly reduce the fiscal deficit. However, the means to be adopted to achieve that end may compound other major economic problems, such as inflation.

(Email: hussainhzaidi@gmail.com)

Administrative reforms for the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) have been on the cards since the last few years. Political pundits, international mentors and bureaucratic advisers have been unanimous in assuming that administrative reforms shall have a positive impact on the prevailing chaos in FATA. Absolute anachronism from the contemporary social norms, detached status from the state apparatus, special judicial provisions, mediaeval tendencies of the inhabitants and an extremely low development threshold are some of the reasons put across in support of the change. Rise in terrorism, lawlessness and religious extremism are other maladies that are weighed in favour of the change.

The Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) -- the century-old statutes inherited from the British Raj and in vogue ever since -- are deemed completely obsolete and draconian in outlook. Hence the change! While making his first address in the National Assembly, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani announced to abolish the FCR. Soon thereafter, the gravity of the situation was realised and the matter is now being examined by a committee. An effective choice for a future administrative system must take recourse to the inherent peculiarities associated with this extraordinary context in our country.

FATA is a geographically and socially isolated region, despite the overlaps with the settled territories in the NWFP and Balochistan, as well as the neighbouring Afghanistan. This context evolved an indigenous culture that is self-serving but radically different from the prevailing norms of civilisation. At the time of Pakistan's independence, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah understood this fine detail and respected it. While addressing the tribesmen on July 30, 1947, he assured them about maintaining traditional independence of the tribal areas. He further stated that the sanctity of all the agreements, treaties and arrangements shall be safeguarded.

Later, a historic representative jirga of all major tribes was held at the NWFP Governor's House in Peshawar on April 17, 1948. In the presence of the Quaid, 200 maliks (tribal influentials chosen by the government) pledged their allegiance to Pakistan and unanimously requested to be placed under the direct administration of the federal government. Their request was met on July 6, 1948, when the Quaid, as governor general, created the Ministry of States and Frontier Regions, and personally took over the responsibility of the tribal areas. The situation remained largely under control for most of the time in our recent history, with the exception of the last decade of acute turbulence.

Under Article 246 and 247 of the 1973 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, FATA falls under the executive authority of the federation. The president, through the NWFP governor, exercises this authority. Normal laws of the country and the usual jurisdiction of courts is not applicable to FATA. In plain terms, the region is governed through the combine of rivaj (customary law) and the FCR, with an outweighing effect of Shariah -- at least in the present scenario. The rivaj draws from Pakhtoonwali (the code of Pakhtoons). It has many indigenous injunctions that are strictly enforced in the day-to-day life of the tribal people.

Some of the main components of the Pakhtoonwali include the right to protect the honour of self and family; hospitality to visitors and guests; revenge upon blood feuds; seeking forgiveness from the victim; council of elders for decision-making; and tribal escort for the travellers passing through the region. The political agents, who are the key government functionaries in FATA, respected this code of conduct in their usual management of the territorial affairs. Maliks also helped in the administration of usual business by practicing the local traditional code.

In case of any misdeed, the political agent had the authority to enforce the writ of the government through a mechanism of incremental punitive action. For instance, in the case of a crime, the political agent would consult the Maliks for immediate handing over of the accused. In case of refusal, he would fine the whole tribe. If the dispute would not be resolved, the tribe could be economically cut off or even attacked by a lashkar of law-enforcement agencies and loyal tribal people.

Though primitive, the system worked reasonably well for more than four decades after the country's independence. The Afghan war during the 1980s, infiltration of proclaimed offenders in FATA, spread of drug and arms money, rise of religious extremism by some tribal groups, and unabated intermingling of left-over mujahideen from the Afghan War made the tribal milieu ungovernable to a great extent. The last nail in the coffin was driven by the government itself, when it yielded under US pressure in the 'war on terror'. Sympathies of many tribal people swayed in favour of religious extremists, who claimed to have the alternative of Shariah. As a result, the system of administration came under stress and became ineffective to a great extent.

There is a dire need for threshold development work in FATA. Some work has been done by the army, while a comprehensive development plan is prepared by the FATA Civil Secretariat. No development activity can be introduced in the area on firm grounds until potent and capable administrative machinery is in place. With the weakening of the institution of political agent and increased presence of the law-enforcement agencies in the area, it is important that an interim arrangement may be contemplated to effectively steer this task.

The political agents complain that the development works are dealt with by the law-enforcement agencies on their own. Unless a co-ordinating mechanism is not enacted, the problems will persist. The development activity also needs the sustained support of the local clergy and tribal elders. It has been reported that due to frequent displacement of population during infighting and air attacks, the task of developmental management has become more complex than before. With a displaced and discontented population, neither development nor administrative revamping of any kind can be achieved to the optimum.

It is obvious that the ultimate objective of the proper integration of FATA in the NWFP and development process is full-scale merger with a significant enhancement in the social, political, economic and strategic status of the region. This objective can be achieved by following a step-wise approach, with administrative revamping one of the main ingredients. As discussed above, FATA suffers from a virtually fractured governance mechanism wherein the previous institutions and traditions have been rendered ineffective. It is also clear that for the conceivable near future, FATA is in for a war that has multiple actors with unpredictable actions. For the sake of simple survival, a strategy is needed.

This strategy must ensure minimisation of damage and gradual reduction in violence. The restitution of the office of political agent is vital. Whereas the armed forces and other law-enforcement agency outfits shall continue to play their roles, it is important that routine business of the tribal belt is dealt with in the same manner as before. It may be noted that the local Taliban have acquired control of many territories in FATA due to this administrative vacuum. It is clear that they have covert supply of funds, which enables them to finance their operations. In their pursuit, they have paralysed the administrative apparatus after taking over the role of de facto government. The top priority, therefore, must be accorded to reviving the existing institutional framework before contemplating any change.

Any radical change in or repeal of the FCR framework is a dangerous proposition. There are many sections in the tribal society who are forcefully demanding the replacement of the FCR with a self-defined version of Shariah. The situation in Swat is a case in point where quasi militant outfits are pressing for the application of the Islamic laws. It is obvious that in the eventuality of abolition of the FCR, the enforcement of Shariah shall become a fiery rallying point in FATA and will be difficult to manage. The prevailing system of governance in the settled areas is not desired by the tribal people and leadership due to the lengthy and complex procedures, delayed dispensation of trials and disputes, and infestation of corrupt practices.

It is common sense that the United States-led 'war on terror' has evoked militant responses from certain violent and militant factions of the tribal society. The medieval social milieu is the perfect ground to use religious fanaticism as the common denominator for legitimising the anti-government approaches. Perception of crimes have very different connotations in the eyes of certain tribal leaders. The pristine form of codal conduct cannot be imagined by the tribal groups, at least in these circumstances. It is in the best interest of Pakistan to use the levers of negotiations and confidence-building, with the US administration to limit its role and stretch the maneuverability for local administration. With this point accepted and respected, ground work for a better administration can be laid down. One way of moving ahead on this front is the speedy materialisation of the US promise of implementing Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) in the area. When operationalised, they would send a positive signal amongst the tribal people about the sincerity of the US in the region.

The development work that is currently being contemplated is another positive aspect. It can be used as a catalyst to build up home grown administrative machinery for development management. The tribal people must be consulted in the decision making and prioritisation of development work to impart a sense of ownership. It is widely proved in development experiments that any work that does not have the consent, participation and willingness of its beneficiaries seldom succeeds. The ambitious outlay of projects prepared by the FATA Secretariat must be deliberated upon with the stakeholders, including tribal elders, chieftains and even clerics.

By employing smart tools of advocacy for development work, the antagonism can be reduced, if not completely eliminated. The normal way to proceed is to move swiftly with consensus and to prefer non-controversial projects to the controversial ones. Tangible benefits to the local population -- such as employment, utilisation of local resources, enhanced social status and better quality of life -- are visible parameters that can help transform populist opinions.

(The writer is chairman of Department of Architecture and Planning, NED University of Engineering and Technology, Karachi.

Email:

nomaniconn@hotmail.com)

As the plane ascended over the Arabian Sea, the contrast between the green waters of Gawadar's coastal line and the brown rugged terrain of mainland Balochistan became even more pronounced. The one-and-half-hour flight to Karachi on PIA's new ATR planes from Gawadar flew exactly over this line, as if suggesting that Gawadar -- for that matter, the whole of Balochistan -- can drift politically and socially anywhere from here. It can become the beacon of economic prosperity in the region, with the rich Baloch identity fully protected and celebrated, and economic benefits widely shared among its people. But then, like the stark contrast between its green waters and brown rugged landscape, it can well enter into a persistent conflict with the Centre over users' rights, royalty from natural resources and identity politics.

Even worse, a further trajectory of the conflict can lead to an open civil war between the state and the people, fuelled by ethnic tensions, civil and military divide, and tribal enmities. After a 10-day stay in Quetta, Turbat, Gawadar and Pasni, I can safely conclude that more wrongs are being committed than rights in Balochistan by the state apparatus. As a result, Balochs have been pushed to the wall and are left with no choice but to announce a formal civil war against the Centre. At the informal level, the Baloch society across the board is in total agreement that its rights are being consistently violated by Punjabis, who dominate the federal government as well as the Pakistan Army.

A typical sentiment shared by all Balochs -- whether they are members of the Balochistan Students Organisation or senior public officials -- is that the province's natural resources are being usurped by the dominant Punjabis. These sentiments are now widespread and shared even by the Pakhtoon population of the province. There is ample evidence to prove that Balochs are being discriminated systemically and that there is indeed an anti-Baloch bias in the establishment. Balochistan produces most of the country's natural gas, but the province itself has only two CNG stations in Quetta. It takes at least two hours to get your car filled -- a consistent reminder of the overall deprivation of Balochs.

As a visitor, a day-long stay in Quetta is enough to expose you to the grave injustices being committed systemically against the Baloch population. Later in the day, an evening dinner at Quetta's best hotel gives you an uncomfortable feel. Here, aid workers, visiting diplomats, contractors and suppliers, and retired and serving officials display their total isolation from the society and talk of business only. Many of them staying here at the expense of their organisations are concerned more about what extra facilities the hotel could provide them with and less about the problems of the people of the province.

Most of these visitors have no connection whatsoever with the actual people, their representatives, and their social and political organisations, which are defining the political idiom of the time. Local NGOs, on the other hand, are only interested in delivering results-based community level services and their relationship with their Islamabad-based international donors is functional at best -- it culminates immediately after the transaction of their final financial installment for the approved project.

Another major problem is that only a few mainstream politicians, writers and intellectuals are able to relate to the opinion-makers of Balochistan. This intellectual isolation has made political workers in Balochistan bitter to such an extent that a quick glance at Assap, a local newspaper published from Turbat, enabled this scribe to identify at least 15 stories pertaining to concerns of various local parties and groups about resource distribution. Even in the remotest parts of the district, one comes across graffiti saying, 'Gawadar will become the graveyard of Punjabis.'

This bitterness and mistrust is mainly a result of the Center's consistent policy of coercion against the common Baloch population. The problem started with the imprisonment of Baloch nationalist leaders in the early 1950s, and then grew in intensity with the hanging of eight Baloch nationalist leaders in the Ayub Khan era. Moreover, the ensuing protests were crushed through military means. In the 1970s, the National Awami Party (NAP) agreed to use the political means to achieve the rights of the Baloch population, but its government led by Sardar Ataullah Mengal was dismissed after only nine months. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the greatest hope for the rest of Pakistan at that time, showed complete insensitivity towards NAP, which could have become a natural ally of his Pakistan People's Party (PPP).

His military action, ironically led by the late Nawab Akbar Bugti, was ruthless and led to the systemic isolation of the Baloch population's popular aspirations. As a result, Baloch nationalist parties failed to regain power in the province for the next 25 years. It was Akhtar Mengal who provided in 1997, as an ally of the Nawaz Sharif-led Pakistan Muslim League (PML), perhaps the only chance after 1973 to gradually create conditions where both the Centre and the province could have come up with some kind of a political settlement to the long-standing disputes over distribution of resources. But Pervez Musharraf's taking over the government, his use of excessive force against the Baloch people and the eventual assassination of Akbar Bugti in a disgraceful manner have now created a context in which the dialogue process cannot even start without major concessions from the Centre.

It is in this very context that mega projects initiated by Musharraf in Balochistan created even more bitterness among Baloch nationalists -- they were trained in the Marxist tradition of more government and less market, and locked in a situation where they were not in a position to shape the nature of development projects initiated in their province. Worse still, their legitimate concerns regarding users' rights, ownership and control of development projects, and gas royalty were not addressed. The story seems so very familiar now -- an ongoing insurgency, a worsening law and order situation, an under-resourced government and almost minimal meaningful presence of any mainstream political party in mainland Baloch districts. The ruling PPP has the potential to correct things, but unfortunately it is plagued with the problem of timing.

Four months after assuming power in both the Centre and Balochistan, there is no major policy initiative in progress by the PPP. Release of Akhtar Mengal is a step in the right direction, but there still are many other people behind the bars, the army operation is going on and there is no clear road-map to address the resource distribution issues. Mainstream political parties and the government should realise that the lack of social, economic and political rights in Balochistan is slowly pushing the people of the province to a state of complete desperation. They, therefore, need to quickly act; it is already too late.

The recent Bollywood super-hit Rang De Basanti and the lawyers' movement have brought to the fore an issue that is very crucial to the understanding of our history. Rang De Basanti, which became an instant hit in Pakistan because of the inspiration it provided to the youth, is based on the lives of three young men -- Bhaghat Singh, Sukhdev and Rajguru -- who were hanged in Lahore in 1931 for resisting the British imperialism.

Similarly, the lawyers' movement has brought to the fore the name of Justice Cornelius, as a judge who stood against the tyranny of a dictator. Surprisingly, the names of such heroes are missing from our history textbooks. Therefore, one is forced to believe that the 'Pakistan Project' of the state is aimed at Islamising the entire society in its own peculiar way and mentioning the historic contribution of non-Muslims does not fit into this scheme of things.

The history Pakistani students are taught in textbooks is problematic in multiple ways. The partition of India and the formation of the new state of Pakistan led to many questions; the most important one of which concerned the identity and history of the Pakistani nation. Because of this reason, Pakistan was divided along ethnic and linguistic lines at the very time of its inception. In order to justify the creation of Pakistan and the promotion of the two-nation theory, our state wrote a history full of omissions, exaggerations, fact twisting and slander -- enough to give an honest historian a nightmare.

Most Pakistan Studies textbooks start with an introduction of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) and the state he established in Medina. Then we jump to Muhammad bin Qasim's invasion of the Indian subcontinent and the 'massive' welcome he received here. After a few 'heroic' stories of Mehmood of Ghazni, we come straight to the 'Islamic' rule of the Mughals. After this 'glorious' period of progress, which the students are told is only possible under Muslim rule, the British entered the fray.

At this point in time, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan 'realised' that Hindus and Muslims were two different nations. From then onwards, the students are taught how the British and Hindus tried to suppress Muslims, with Gandhi and Nehru being the major culprits. Despite all these adversities, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah was able to lead the Muslims to a separate nation and we have lived happily ever after.

There are numerous problems with the above-mentioned narrative of history. First, people did exist in this part of the world before Islam came to Hejaz. Hence, these people have a history but it remains a taboo in our textbooks. Second, Muhammad bin Qasim or any of the subsequent Muslim invaders were neither Pakistanis nor, for that matter, Indians. They came as invaders from foreign lands and to portray them as indigenous people is intellectual dishonestly of the highest order. None of them was interested in imposing Shariah; rather, what was more important to them was the wealth they could acquire. That is why Mehmood of Ghazni invaded India many a time, but never tried to establish a truly Islamic government here.

The characterisation of the Mughal period as 'Islamic' is especially disturbing. For the most part, Mughal emperors remained interested in consolidating their power, because of which they were forced to keep their regimes secular. In fact, Akbar is known as the first ruler who introduced inter-faith dialogue amongst his subjects. For this purpose, he also established the residency of Dharampura in Lahore, where people from different religions could openly discuss their beliefs. It should not come as a surprise then that Akbar is termed an 'infidel' and a 'traitor' in Pakistani textbooks. All Mughal emperors appointed Hindu governors, ministers and advisers, which shows that they had secular leanings, and the Pakistani state has distorted their image only to justify its existence.

Things get even uglier when we read about the British Raj. Hindus and Sikhs are portrayed as monsters trying to extract revenge from Muslims with the full support of the British. Yet, it was the Muslim League that declared in 1906 that it would extend full co-operation to the British. The party offered its full-fledged support to the British during World War II, when the Indian National Congress was leading the Quit India Movement. The fact that Jinnah never went to jail in opposition to the British is portrayed as a sign of 'respect' he commanded among the British, while Gandhi was repeatedly put behind bars for his noncompliance of the 'law'. The complete rejection of the Muslim League in the 1937 elections is not even discussed, while a narrow margin of victory in the 1946 elections is seen as a proof of the validity of the two-nation theory. The fact that all Muslim feudals had joined the Muslim League before the 1946 elections is again very inconvenient for the establishment to accept.

What is astonishing is that our students are never taught about non-Muslims who lived in this part of the Indian subcontinent that is known as Pakistan, as if they never existed. In the last 60 years, we have tried to remove all symbols that could possibly remind people of their truly diverse history that is thousands of years old. Hindus and Sikhs have been rulers of this geographical area, which has produced many non-Muslim writers, poets, intellectuals, activists, religious leaders and accomplished people in other fields.

The courage of Rani of Jhansi or Mangal Pandey is not emphasised, and our students are not taught that Ranjit Singh was the last Indian ruler to offer resistance against the British. Not many of us are aware that Bhaghat Singh was born in Lyalpur (now Faisalabad) and he went to the gallows for the freedom of the Indian people. We forget that Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs enjoyed excellent relations for the larger period of our history. However, our textbooks have no space for such accounts. All Hindus and Sikhs are generalised in a crude way as enemies of the Muslim people.

In this attempt to give history a specific direction, our textbooks have made a mockery of the subject. It is important to realise that there is always another point of view out there. Trying to censor any point of view that does not match the thinking of the establishment is a grave injustice to this fascinating subject. The need of the hour is to introduce freethinking and tolerance for different points of view, so that we can have a genuine debate on our history. This way, we will be able to develop more interest in the subject and will find it easier to reach the truth without any external pressure to conform.

(Email: aa_jan@hotmail.com)

The recent political turmoil in Pakistan has sidetracked the attention from many issues affecting millions of poor. Every day, Amin Dablo, a resident of Hajamro creek, Keti Bunder, cruises his boat four-kilometre to buy drinking water. He pays Rs10 for 16 litres and Rs60 for daily consumption, which is even more than the amount paid by people living in posh localities of big cities. Dablo is one of the almost one million people whose forefathers settled in Indus Delta centuries ago when the area offered livelihood opportunities. Economic and livelihood opportunities attracted people to settle on the banks of creeks created by the mighty River Indus before falling into the ocean.

In fact, this grandeur of delta owed to fresh water flows of River Indus. The fresh water and millions of tonnes of silt deposition, over a long period of time, formed this vast area of 700,000 hectares along the coastline of southern Pakistan. The delta was shared by people, wildlife, birds, as well as other flora and fauna. It was a completely balanced ecosystem, providing services to all forms of life. Unfortunately, the area has gone through severe degradation in the recent past. In short, deterioration of this important wetland can be referred to as the worst example of human intervention in the nature.

Political economy of water resources development and management in Pakistan has shifted benefits from the Indus Delta to upstream users. Rich deltaic communities were made poor by policy decisions. The policy paradigm for water resources development, since the last century, has brought several negative consequences for this area. First, diversion of fresh water from the delta to upstream lands for agriculture reduced the water flows (from 17 MAF in the 1930s to less than 10 MAF at present) to the delta and hence the deltaic communities lost their vital resource.

The resulting degradation manifested itself in reduction of mangroves coverage (important fish habitat), declining fish stocks, shrinking agricultural land and vegetation, vertical and horizontal intrusion of sea, degraded ground water, and significant reduction in livestock's grazing areas. Second, the intensive agriculture (through flood irrigation) supported by the water, which was held upstream through dams and barrages, and distributed through canals and distributaries, gave rise to agricultural wastes, which end up in the delta. On the one hand, it ruined the communities of an area on the pretext of developing other areas through the increase of agricultural production; while, on the other, it caused degradation of the lands upstream through water logging and salinity.

This water resources development paradigm never considered nature as a water user, due to the weak political constituency of environment. In addition to nature, universally accepted rights of lower riparian were massively violated. The disaster as a consequence of such policy decisions was neither addressed by the government nor aid agencies. However, the implications are not less than any big human disaster. Some of the human and ecological consequences are mentioned below:

First, mangroves -- the guardians of Pakistan's coast and the identity of Indus Delta -- are lost. The Indus Delta use to hold 97 percent of unique mangroves, being one of the largest in the arid zones. Local communities used them for fuel wood, timber, fodder, grazing of livestock, etc. Mangroves are breeding grounds for commercial fish species, such as shrimps, crabs and lobsters. They serve as a barrier against harbour erosion, Tsunamis, strong winds and cyclones. Mangroves are also essential in the changing climatic conditions, in which the frequency of cyclones has increased. Clearing this shield will make coastal towns and communities more vulnerable to disasters. Before the deterioration of the Indus Delta, 260,000 hectares of land was covered with eight species of mangroves. Half of this area has been lost and only four species out of eight have survived. Of these four, Avicennia marina covers 95 percent of the current mangroves cover. Hence, important mangrove ecosystem is under serious threat.

Second, coastal poverty, hopelessness and despair are rampant. Poor communities having no other income sources are putting pressure on fishing and mangrove resources. The interlocked fish market and indebtness have further aggravated the situation. The trend of migration is also on rise -- villages are being inundated due to sea intrusion and people are compelled to migrate mostly to Karachi, hence contributing to rapid urbanisation process. Not long ago busy port town of Keti Bunder is now reduced to less than 2,000 habitants and protected by an embankment. It is continuously under threat of cyclone and may collapse any time in case of a severe weather shock.

Third, losses to ecosystem functioning and services are huge and irreparable. Several habitats and ecosystems are lost, as are ecosystem services. The reduction of ecosystem services has seriously affected economic productivity, including decrease in palla fish breeding and catch riverine forest products, and loss of wildlife species, agriculture and marine fish species. If the process continues, many more forest, fish, bird and wildlife species may vanish soon. This will exacerbate the poverty and decrease future development potential for the people who depend entirely on these resources.

Fourth, the drainage project of Left Bank Outfall Drain (LBOD) in the Badin district has significantly changed the geography of the area. Most importantly, the project has affected coastal wetlands complex, out of which two wetlands are Ramsar sites. According to a World Bank inspection panel report, which investigated the violation of the Bank's policies in financing the LBOD project in 2005, one of these wetlands is biologically dead. The main reason of destruction is associated with the wrong design of tidal link in LBOD project, which brought sea water into wetlands and changed the salinity level.

Fifth, deltaic communities have no access to water and sanitation facilities. This problem stretches from Hawks bay to Ali Bandar in the Badin district. Majority of fisherfolk who use to live on the banks of fresh water rivers or creeks are the worst affectees of drinking water crisis. These people pay more than the rich of Pakistan for water services. This is worst example of social injustice in our society and it has a huge economic cost for these people too.

The story does not end here. The development policy processes that caused the death of Indus delta are still continuing. There is little realisation about this silent human crisis of more than one million people, flora and fauna of the area and one of the vital ecosystem of Pakistan. The responsible institutions have made joke of this serious problem. The officials of WAPDA consider water down stream kotri barrage as a waste. Similarly, the donors after supporting huge infrastructure upstream are still desperate to finance mega reservoirs with lip service to the delta and environmental problems.

(The writer is an environment and development expert with WaterAid-Pakistan.

Email: mustafa@wateraid.org.pk)

The recent Long March has raised many questions about the relationship between the lawyers' community and the Pakistan People's Party (PPP). On the positive side of the equation, the PPP can be credited with making the Long March possible by easing the protestors' movement to their destination. This is quite an advance in terms of governance, which places the PPP in league with other democratic-minded governments that tolerate difference of opinion. Beyond this, the relationship between the lawyers' community and the PPP gets more convoluted.

The PPP's complicated relationship with the lawyers' movement can be traced to its leadership's political zigzags, spurred by a series of compromises the party made with Pervez Musharraf's regime. This compromised position put the PPP in an awkward situation in relation to the lawyers' movement, which is basically aimed at the ouster of Musharraf and the restoration of deposed CJP Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry. When the lawyers' movement started in March 2007, the PPP's response was very calculated. As a result, it was alleged that the PPP was trying to thrash out a deal with Musharraf for the safe return of the exiled Benazir Bhutto.

Though seen to be supporting lawyers in terms of its strategic participation in the pro-chief justice rallies, the PPP leadership kept on the safe side of the debate by not openly criticising the recent acts of Musharraf. In November, however, the policy of standing politically aloof from a gathering social movement became almost untenable after the imposition of emergency. Sensing popular wind behind the lawyers' movement, the late Benazir Bhutto made some cosmetic adjustments to her political strategy. This adjustment involved visiting the deposed chief justice's residence to demand his release. Earlier, she had also paid a fleeting visit to a journalist rally to re-establish her pro-judiciary credentials.

Despite making a few public appearances for the lawyers' cause (partly due to Musharraf's changing stance over the NRO), Benazir stuck to her abstract line of restoring the judiciary, but not necessarily the deposed chief justice. This policy is still being followed by the PPP even after Benazir's tragic death, because it supports the PPP top leadership's new forged closeness to the establishment. Continuing with this policy involves pitting the PPP against the prevailing public mood, which is overwhelmingly pro-chief justice.

While the PPP can take the credit for making the Long March possible, it would be akin to misjudging its alienation from most people who have thrown themselves behind the movement. This sense of alienation within the workers of the party is visibly growing and may prove fatal in terms of future mobilisation, particularly when the pulling figure of Benazir is no longer there. A large part of this sense of alienation has been caused by the way decisions are being made by a selected few in the party.

From a cursory look at the media, it is not difficult to deduce that old party guard and the experienced hands have been sidelined. More ominously, the policies are being allegedly framed by a group of recent entrants to the PPP, whose link with the party's culture is very weak (this bears uncanny resemblance to the way Blair's Young Turk -- not schooled in the party's history -- changed the British Labour party and moved it away from its historical power base). In an effort not to antagonise the establishment, the party has withdrawn into its 'safety first' mentality.

Though Asif Zardari's stolid silence may give the whiff of a long-term game plan, there is no evidence that the party intends to return to its roots -- the masses. This alienation from the mass is going to acquire greater salience in the absence of a charismatic leader like Benazir. Moreover, the policy of disengaging the party from the people and the most energetic social movement of recent years may cost dearly in future. There is widespread feeling that Benazir would have acted differently in these circumstances and would not have let things go thus far.

By not taking a firm stand on the issue of judges, the PPP has provided space to right-of-centre parties to enter the progressive civil rights discourse. Historically, the party has been in the vanguard of social protest movements for the rule of law and civil rights. There are strong indications that the PPP would restore the judges in future, but only after the lawyers' movement is shown to be exhausted as a proof of its grand game. The package reportedly also includes protecting the repressive measures of Musharraf ñ a far cry for a party known for its anti-dictatorship credentials.

But the damage done to the concept of people's power, asserting itself in a magnificent show of nationwide mobilisation, would be irreparable; and the only loser would be the PPP, which itself grew out of a social protest movement of the 1960s. In future, the social movement may be led by forces of the right if the PPP does not correct its stance and makes a direct reference to the people. With charismatic Benazir out of the scene, the bond between people and the party is likely to be tested in the days to come.

(Email:

arif_azad6@hotmail.com)